

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

ISMAIL HASSAN-EL,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	Civ. No. 15-769-SLR
	)	
WILMINGTON POLICE	)	
DEPARTMENT, et al.,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

**MEMORANDUM**

1. **Background.** Plaintiff, filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He proceeds pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

2. **Standard of Review.** A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) if “the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” *Ball v. Famiglio*, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); *see also* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions). The court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. *Phillips v. County of Allegheny*, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).

3. An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a

court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or a “clearly baseless” or “fantastic or delusional” factual scenario.

*Neitzke*, 490 at 327-28; *Wilson v. Rackmill*, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); see, e.g., *Deutsch v. United States*, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995).

4. The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. *Tourscher v. McCullough*, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court must grant plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See *Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.*, 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

5. A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). A plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See *Johnson v. City of Shelby*, \_\_U.S.\_\_, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014). A complaint may not be dismissed, however, for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See *id.* at 346. When determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the court must take three steps: “(1) identify[] the elements of the claim, (2) review[] the complaint to strike conclusory allegations, and then (3) look[] at the well-pleaded components of the complaint and evaluat[e] whether all of the

elements identified in part one of the inquiry are sufficiently alleged.” *Malleus v. George*, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). Elements are sufficiently alleged when the facts in the complaint “show” that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” *Id.*

6. **Discussion.** Plaintiff alleges that, on September 1, 2013, he was arrested with excessive force when unnamed police beat him up and tazed him. Plaintiff states that he was in the 1000 block of 2<sup>nd</sup> Street, apparently in Wilmington, Delaware. Plaintiff was charged with loitering and resisting arrest. He seeks damages for his injuries.

7. **Municipal Liability.** Plaintiff has named the Wilmington Police Department as one of the defendants. The other defendants are John Does 1, 2, and 3. As an initial matter, the court notes that plaintiff attempts to impose “vicarious liability” upon the Wilmington Police Department. The proper party in interest, however, is the City of Wilmington. See *Boyd v. Wilmington Police Dep’t*, 439 F. Supp. 2d 343, 345 n.3 (D. Del. 2006). In addition, even were the court to construe claims as being properly brought against the City of Wilmington, plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim against it.

8. A municipality may only be held liable under § 1983 when the “execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury.” *Andrews v. City of Philadelphia*, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990). While a government policy is established by a

"decisionmaker possessing final authority," a custom arises from a "course of conduct . . . so permanent and well settled as to virtually constitute law." *Andrews*, 895 F.2d at 1480 (citing *Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York*, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Accordingly, a plaintiff seeking to recover from a municipality must: (1) identify an allegedly unconstitutional policy or custom, (2) demonstrate that the municipality, through its deliberate and culpable conduct, was the "moving force" behind the injury alleged; and (3) demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the alleged deprivation of federal rights. See *Board of the Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown*, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997); *Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle*, 622 F.3d 248, 263 (3d Cir. 2010).

9. Plaintiff has not pled that the City of Wilmington was the "moving force" behind any alleged constitutional violation. Absent any allegation that a custom or policy established by the City of Wilmington directly caused harm to plaintiff, his § 1983 claim cannot stand. Therefore, the claim will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). However, since it appears plausible that plaintiff may be able to articulate a claim against defendant (or name alternative defendants), he will be given an opportunity to amend his pleading.

10. **Conclusion.** For the above reasons, the court will dismiss the complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). Plaintiff will be given leave to amend. A separate order shall issue.

Dated: 11/4, 2015

  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE